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When a person seeks to be relieved from their contractual obligations on the basis
of supervening knowledge of a fact existing at the time of contracting that has rendered
their performance impracticable or even impossible, and/or has frustrated their purpose
in entering into the contract, they would appear to have a choice between asserting a
mutual mistake enforceability defense or instead asserting one or more of the
impossibility, impracticability, or frustration of purpose excuse defenses. Do they in fact
have this choice, or does each of these approaches for obtaining judicial relief have its
own distinct scope of application, with little if any overlap? If there are circumstances
where a person does have this choice, which approach is likely to be more promising as
the primary means of seeking relief?
There is, unfortunately, a relative absence of clarifying case law on this question,
and this brief article considers the guidance provided by Sections 152 and 266 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the associated Official Comments. The article
concludes that where there is a choice available between the two approaches the question
as to which one to most aggressively pursue, rather than only plead secondarily in the
alternative, turns upon the definition of “materiality” that will be applied by the court with

41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 4 Side B

09/18/2019 11:37:45

CRESPI, G - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2

9/17/2019 1:57 PM

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1

regard to the mutual mistake defense. The mutual mistake defense approach is likely to be
the more promising tact in all instances, although perhaps only marginally so if the court
applies the most stringent materiality criterion somewhat ambivalently suggested by the
Official Comment to Restatement (Second) Section 152.
I. INTRODUCTION
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1. That person could be a defendant in a breach of contract action, or the plaintiff in an action seeking either
rescission or reformation of the contract. I will hereafter refer to the person asserting a mutual mistake defense
or an excuse defense in an attempt to reduce or eliminate their contractual obligations as the ³party seeking
relief.´
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating, ³[w]here a mistake of
both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the contract was made has a
material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party
unless he bears the risk of mistake under the rule stated in Section 154´).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266(1)±(2) (stating, ³[w]here, at the time a contract is made,
a party¶s performance under it is impracticable without his fault because of a fact of which he has no reason to
know and the non-existence of which is a basic assumption on which the contract is made, no duty to render that
performance arises, unless the language or circumstances indicate the contrary . . . . Where, at the time a contract
is made, a party¶s principle purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by a fact of which he has no
reason to know and the non-existence of which is a basic assumption on which the contract is made, no duty of
that party to render that performance arises, unless the language or circumstances indicate the contrary.´).
4. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Grp., Inc. (ALOCA), 499 F. Supp. 53, 70±72 (1980) (stating, ³In broad
outline the doctrines of impracticability and frustration of purpose resemble the doctrine of mistake . . . there is
a substantial area of similarity between the three doctrines´).
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Assume that two persons have entered into a contract with one another. Assume also
that at the time of contracting they each reasonably believed that a certain possible event
had not occurred. That event had already taken place, however, and the contracting parties
WKHQODWHUOHDUQHGRIWKLVDVLWXDWLRQFRPPRQO\UHIHUUHGWRDVWKHLUREWDLQLQJ³VXSHUYHQLQJ
NQRZOHGJH´RIDIDFWH[LVWLQJDWWKHWLPHRIFRQWUDFWLQJ$VVXPHQRZWKDWRQHSDUW\WRWKH
contract then seeks judicial relief from their contractual obligations because their
performance has been made significantly more burdensome by the event²perhaps enough
more so to be made impracticable or even impossible²or because their principal purpose
in entering into the contract has been substantially frustrated by the event, or both. 1
Given supervening knowledge of an existing fact that has these adverse
FRQVHTXHQFHVIRUDSHUVRQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHREOLJDWLRQVDQGRUIRUWKHDELOLW\RIWKHFRQWUDFW
to satisfy their purposes there appear to be two plausible arguments that this person could
offer in an attempt to obtain judicial relief from their obligations. One argument would be
that the circumstances meet the criteria for judicial relief on the basis of a mutual mistake
as to a fact existing at the time of contracting. 2 The other argument would be that the
circumstances meet the criteria for relief from contractual obligations because a fact that
was unknown to both of the parties at the time of contracting gives rise to either an
impracticability or impossibility or frustration of purpose excuse defense. 3
Both the mutual mistake and excuse defense theories appear on their face to fit this
simple hypothetical situation equally well; they clearly have at OHDVWD³VXEVWDQWLDODUHDRI
VLPLODULW\´4 Where both approaches appear to be potentially viable, one would think that
the mutual mistake theory would in general be the better approach to pursue, given that it
would appear to be much easier to demonstrate WKH³PDWHULDOLW\´RIWKHPLVWDNHDVWKDW
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A second distinction between the [mutual mistake and impracticability] doctrines, however, makes
mistake appear the more attractive argument. A party who claims relief for mistake must show that
the mistake had a material effect on his performance. . . . To obtain relief for impracticability, on the
other hand, the party must show that the event had made performance impossible or nearly so. . . .
Thus, a party arguing mutual mistake has the advantage in that he need not show that performance
has become impracticable, but need only show that the balance of the exchange was materially
affected.
E. Allan Farnsworth, Julia L. Brickell & Stephen P. Chawaga, Relief for Mutual Mistake and Impracticability, 1
J.L. & COM. 1, 27 (1981).
6. There is, of course, no reason why a person seeking relief could not plead both of these theories as
alternative bases for relief, and this is often done. As a matter of argumentative strategy, however, it is usually
more effective to first argue the more plausible theory that advances one¶s case before turning to less persuasive
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defense requires, than it would be to meet the very demanding eligibility criteria for any
of the several excuse defenses that I will later discuss. 5 But is it really that simple? Do the
two approaches overlap whenever supervening knowledge of an existing fact has the
significant consequences noted above, thus always favoring assertion of the mutual
mistake defense? Or do these approaches instead each have largely separate and distinct
areas of application, with only limited overlap, with the appropriate tact to take in seeking
relief depending on the presence or absence of certain other factors? And in those instances
where there is overlap, at least in the limited sense that the several common threshold
requirements of each of the two approaches are met, what other factors might suggest that
a particular approach would be the most promising?
I have been teaching introductory contract law at the Dedman School of Law at
Southern Methodist University for almost thirty years. Over that time, I have always called
WRP\VWXGHQWV¶DWWHQWLRQWKHIDFWWKDW, under the circumstances of supervening knowledge
of an existing fact that has the impact described above, we have the unusual situation of
two different mitigating doctrines, based on different underlying rationales, that each
appear to apply as a basis for the party prejudiced by the fact obtaining relief. This point
unfortunately comes up towards the end of the spring semester when I am scrambling to
try to complete the two-semester contracts course sequence coverage, and my time is
unusually tight. As a result, I have always rather superficially and cavalierly told my
students that if they need to later address this question on behalf of their clients they should
³FKHFN Whe probably rather sparse collection of mutual mistake and excuse defense
SUHFHGHQWVWKDWH[LVWLQWKHUHOHYDQWMXULVGLFWLRQ´WRVHHZKLFKWKHRU\ZRXOGDSSHDUWREH
more promising as a means of obtaining relief, given the specific facts of their case, and
that in most instances the mutual mistake approach is likely to be the more promising tact
because of its less demanding requirements, and I leave it at that. I have now decided that
it is time for me to give this question a little more thought so that I can provide students
with a more complete and accurate discussion of the choices that lawyers will face under
these circumstances the next time that I cover this material in class.
In this brief essay, I will first consider whether there is any basis in the law for
JXLGLQJDSHUVRQ¶VFKRLFHEHWZHHQDVVHUWLRQRIWKHPXWXDOPLVWDNHGHIHQVHRUDVVHUWLRQRI
the relevant excuse defense, under those supervening knowledge circumstances that
potentially satisfy the elements of either defense, in an attempt to obtain judicial relief
from their contractual obligations. 6 I will then consider whether the legal principles that
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now guide this choice are justified.
II. MUTUAL MISTAKE V. THE EXCUSE DEFENSES
The ideal source of authority for choosing between the mutual mistake and the
excuse defense approaches as a means for obtaining relief under supervening knowledge
circumstances would be the judicial opinions handed down in those cases where a person
has asserted both a mutual mistake defense and an excuse defense as alternative bases for
relief under those circumstances, where both approaches satisfy the several threshold
criteria they share that I will later discuss, and where the court has then granted relief under
one theory but denied it under the other theory. Unfortunately, I have not been able to
locate any such cases. There is one relatively well-known 1980 case that I will refer to
extensively in this article in which a federal district court discussed at length the mutual
mistake approach and both the impracticability and frustration of purpose excuse defense
approaches, and then granted relief under each of these several theories, 7 and there are
likely to exist at least a few other such cases as well.8 In addition, there are many opinions
in which courts have denied both mutual mistake and excuse defense arguments for relief.
But I have not located any cases which allow relief under one approach but reject the other
approach when they have both been advanced as alternative theories, and that would thus
suggest fact-specific grounds for choosing between the two approaches. The paucity, if
not complete absence, of such cases suggests that any meaningful distinctions that can be
drawn between these two approaches as to their relative merits and proper scope of
application will be rather subtle. In the absence of clear case law, let me now turn to the
guidance provided by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
A. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts Framework
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alternative theories, if those other theories are convincing enough to even merit being argued at all, and to do this
one must first assess which approach is more likely to prove successful.
7. ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 65. In that case the federal district court extensively discussed the mutual mistake
argument, as well as the impracticability and frustration of purpose arguments, that ALCOA had made seeking
equitable modification of the terms of its contract with Essex Group, Inc. Id. at 53±78. The court there ruled that
under Indiana law, each of these three theories provided a sufficient independent basis for granting ALCOA the
relief sought. Id. at 70±72. The opinion provides a comprehensive and useful discussion of the several elements
of each of these theories. See id. at 60±78. However, since the court upheld all three of these theories (apparently
in anticipation of being subjected to close appellate review, id. at 70) the case unfortunately does not shed much
light on the appropriate contours of the various approaches, on when one approach is likely to prove more
promising than the others. As I will later discuss, however, the ALCOA opinion does discuss the ³material effect´
criterion of the mutual mistake defense, id. at 64±65, a topic that has some relevance for choosing between the
two approaches.
8. See, e.g., Murray v. Willistown Twp., 169 A.3d 84, 92 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (upholding a mutual mistake
claim on appeal while noting that ³the issue here more closely resembles one of impracticability of
performance´).

41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 5 Side B

If one compares the Restatement (Second) of Contracts treatment of the mutual
mistake defense with its treatment of the several excuse defenses under supervening
knowledge circumstances, one can see that the drafters of that document had in mind that
these two approaches should have somewhat different primary areas of application, but
with some overlap as well. The position taken appears to be that under most (but not all)
circumstances either one or the other of these two approaches would be better suited to
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addressing the equities of the situation than would be the other approach. These
distinctions, however, are somewhat buried in ambiguous discussions contained in the
Official Comments rather than featured more visibly and clearly in the text of the relevant
Sections, and consequently they have received less scholarly and judicial attention than
they perhaps merit.
Let me start by setting out for comparison the text of Restatement (Second) Section
152(1) that articulates the common law mutual mistake defense with the text of Section
266(1) and (2) that sets forth the scope of the common law impracticability defense (and
implicitly also the impossibility defense) and the frustration of purpose defense under
supervening knowledge circumstances.
B. Analysis of the Text of Sections 152(1) and 266(1) and (2)
Section 152. When Mistake of Both Parties Makes a Contract Voidable
(1) Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption
on which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of
performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party unless he bears
the risk of mistake under the rule stated in Section 154.9
Section 266. Existing Impracticability or Frustration
(1) :KHUHDWWKHWLPHDFRQWUDFWLVPDGHDSDUW\¶VSHUIRUPDQFHXQGHULWLVLPSUDFWLFDEOH
without his fault because of a fact of which he has no reason to know and the nonexistence of which is a basic assumption on which the contract is made, no duty to
render that performance arises, unless the language or circumstances indicate the
contrary.
(2) :KHUH DW WKH WLPH D FRQWUDFW LV PDGH D SDUW\¶V SULQFLSOH SXUSRVH LV VXEVWDQWLDOO\
frustrated without his fault by a fact of which he has no reason to know and the nonexistence of which is a basic assumption on which the contract is made, no duty of that
party to render that performance arises, unless the language or circumstances indicate
the contrary.10

Both the mutual mistake and the excuse defense approaches require the person
seeking relief under supervening knowledge circumstances to satisfy the same three
threshold elements. First, they each require that the non-existence of the relevant facts at
the time of contracting was a basic assumption shared by both parties to the contract.
Second, they each require that the party seeking relief is not at fault for not knowing that
the relevant facts already existed at the time of contracting. Third, they each require that
neither the contract language nor the surrounding circumstances indicate that the party
seeking relief has assumed the risk of the relevant facts being in existence at the time of
contracting.11 Failure to meet all three of these threshold requirements will bar a person
from obtaining relief under either approach. So, assuming that all three of these threshold

41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 6 Side A

9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266(1)±(2) .
11. In his prominent contract law treatise, Allan Farnsworth takes the position that, with regard to these two
approaches, ³it is more likely that a party will be regarded as having borne the risk of mistake than the risk of
existing frustration.´ E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 607 (4th ed. 2004). See also Farnsworth, Brickell &
Chawaga, supra note 5, at 27 (³[C]ourts are more likely to find that a party bore the risk of the disadvantage
caused by a mutual mistake than that a party assumed the risk that performance would become impracticable.´).

09/18/2019 11:37:45

C M
Y K

41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 6 Side B

09/18/2019 11:37:45

CRESPI, G - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

6

9/17/2019 1:57 PM

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1

C M
Y K

09/18/2019 11:37:45

12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266(1). While Section 266 does not have a provision relating
to supervening impossibility, presumably that situation is covered under Section 266(1) as an extreme form of
impracticability where the increase in cost resulting from the relevant events is essentially infinite.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266(2).
15. For discussion of the various criteria of the excuse defenses see, e.g., ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. 53, 70±78.
See also U.C.C. § 2-615 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM¶N 2002) and the Official Comment to that section;
Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Frustration of Contractual Purpose–Doctrine or Myth?, 70 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 239
(1996); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 207 (2009);
Farnsworth, Brickell & Chawaga, supra note 5, at 6.
16. Consider, for example, UCC § 2-207, the ³battle of the forms´ provision. Under § 2-207(2)(b) an
additional term in an expression of acceptance will not become part of the contract if it ³materially´ alters the
contract, and Official Comments 4 and 5 to that Section make clear that the drafters here intended to impose a
very low de minimis materiality threshold.
17. See., e.g., TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 444±49 (1976) (defining a ³material´ fact as one for
which there need be only a substantial likelihood that it would have assumed actual significance in the
deliberations of a reasonable shareholder).
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241, which assesses whether a party¶s failure to fully
perform a contract obligation is ³material´ by a complex multi-factor analysis where the extent to which the
deficient performance impairs the benefits obtained by the other party is only one factor to be considered.
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elements are met under supervening knowledge circumstances, based on the text of these
two Restatement (Second) Sections which of these two approaches is more likely to
succeed as a basis for obtaining relief?
The key concept for sorting this out is the principle of materiality. Once the threshold
criteria noted above have been met, the remaining criterion for the mutual mistake defense
XQGHU6HFWLRQ  LVWKDWWKHPLVWDNHKDYHD³PDWHULDOHIIHFWRQWKHDJUHHGH[FKDQJH´ 12
Each of the several excuse defenses also has its own required hardship criterion, in lieu of
a materiality criterion, in addition to those three threshold criteria set forth above. Under
Section 266(1), WKH UHPDLQLQJ FULWHULRQ LV WKDW WKH SDUW\¶V SHUIRUPDQFH EH UHQGHUHG
³LPSUDFWLFDEOH´13 and under Section 266(2), WKH UHPDLQLQJ FULWHULRQ LV WKDW WKH SDUW\¶V
³SULQFLSOHSXUSRVHLVVXEVWDQWLDOO\IUXVWUDWHG´14 There is an extensive body of case law
regarding what must be demonstrated to satisfy each of these various criteria for being
excused that I will not address in this brief essay, other than to here note that the several
excuse defenses all have very demanding requirements.15 The question I will focus upon
here is this: under these supervening knowledge circumstances when one or more of these
excuse defenses is potentially available as an avenue for relief, is the mutual mistake
approach also available as an alternative approach and, if so, under what circumstances
would the mutual mistake approach be the more promising approach to pursue?
³0DWHULDOLW\´ LV D UDWKHU SURWHDQ OHJDO FRQFHSW, one that takes different shapes in
different contractual contexts. The usual unGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHSKUDVH³PDWHULDOFKDQJH´
under general commercial law16 or under securities law17 is that it refers to any change that
is more than de minimis in impact, a very low threshold. On the other hand, the assessment
DVWRZKHWKHUDSHUVRQ¶VIDLOure to fully perform a contractual obligation rises to the level
RI D ³PDWHULDO EUHDFK´ IRU WKH SXUSRVH RI GHWHUPLQLQJ ZKHWKHU WKHUH KDV EHHQ QRQfulfillment of an implied-in-ODZ FRQGLWLRQ RI WKH RWKHU SDUW\¶V SHUIRUPDQFH REOLJDWLRQV
involves a complex, multi-factor analysis where in some instances even a significantly
GHILFLHQWSHUIRUPDQFHPD\EHUHJDUGHGDVD³QRQ-PDWHULDOEUHDFK´18 The impracticability
H[FXVHGHIHQVHLQFRQWUDVWXVXDOO\UHTXLUHVIDUPRUHWKDQVLPSO\³PDWHULDO´LQFUHDVHVLQ
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the cost of performance, as well as requiring a significant change in the nature of the
required performance.19 The impossibility excuse defense is of course even more
demanding as to the necessary impact of the relevant events upon performance. And the
benefits that a SDUW\ H[SHFWV WR REWDLQ IURP D FRQWUDFW KDYH WR EH QRW MXVW ³PDWHULDOO\´
reduced but instead drastically impaired, if not eliminated altogether, by an event for its
LPSDFW WR EH UHJDUGHG DV VXIILFLHQW WR ³VXEVWDQWLDOO\ IUXVWUDWH´ D SHUVRQ¶V ³SULQFLSOH
purSRVH´20
The conclusion therefore suggested by comparing the texts of Sections 152(1) and
266(1) and (2) is that the mutual mistake approach should probably be the preferred
approach for seeking relief; even if an excuse defense may also be potentially available,
GXH WR WKH OHVV VWULQJHQW ³PDWHULDOLW\´ UHTXLUHPHQW WKH PXWXDO PLVWDNH DSSURDFK ZLOO
dominate each of the excuse defenses with their more restrictive criteria under all
circumstances in which both approaches meet the other threshold criteria.21 In other words,
the mutual mistake approach will allow for a party to obtain relief in all supervening
knowledge situations where relief could also be obtained on the basis of impracticability
(or impossibility) under Section 266(1), or where relief would be available for frustration
of purpose under Section 266(2), as well as providing relief under some circumstances
where none of those excuse defenses would succeed.
C. The Official Comments to Sections 152 and 266
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19. See, e.g., Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see also U.C.C.
§ 2-615 cmt. 4; Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 243.
20. See Weiskopf, supra note 15, at 259.
21. ³[M]utual mistake . . . does not require the same level of loss [as does the impracticability excuse] to
permit avoidance of the contract, i.e., mutual mistake only requires a material effect upon performance.´ JOHN
EDWARD MURRAY JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 719 n.74 (5th ed. 2011).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) cmt. c, illus. 9 (stating, ³In such [ordinary] cases the
materiality of the effect on the agreed exchange will be determined by the overall impact on both parties. In
exceptional cases the adversely affected party may be able to show that the effect on the agreed exchange has
been material simply on the ground that the exchange has become less desirable for him, even though there has
been no effect on the other party. Cases of hardship that result in no advantage to the other party are, however,
ordinarily appropriately left to the rules on impracticability and frustration. See Illustration 9 and Section 266.´)
(emphasis added). The Comment unfortunately does not clarify what would constitute an ³exceptional´ case
where the mutual mistake defense could be asserted even where only one party has been impacted by the mistake.
23. Id.
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This conclusion, which is based solely upon a textual comparison of the two relevant
Restatement (Second) Sections, is undercut to some extent, however, by the Official
Comments to these Sections for a couple of reasons. First of all, Comment (c) to Section
152 takes the positiRQWKDWIRUWKHUHWREHD³PDWHULDOHIIHFWXSRQWKHH[FKDQJH´IRUPXWXDO
PLVWDNHSXUSRVHV H[FHSWIRU³H[FHSWLRQDOFDVHV´ 22), the mistake must have an impact on
both of the parties to the contract, not merely an impact only upon the person seeking relief
as to the cost or nature or possibility of their performance even if that impact is very
VXEVWDQWLDORUDVWRWKHDELOLW\RIWKHFRQWUDFWWRPHHWWKDWSHUVRQ¶VSULPDU\SXUSRVHVDJDLQ
without regard to the significance of this impact. 23
The drafters of Section 152(1) apparently envisioned as the paradigm cases for
defining the scope of the mutual mistake defense the two classic nineteenth century cases,
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Sherwood v. Walker24 and Wood v. Boynton,25 where one of these cases allowed the
defense26 and the other did not.27 In each of those cases the mutual mistake made as to the
value of the goods at issue in setting the contract price impacted both the buyers and sellers
of the goods, benefitting the buyers but injuring the sellers by an equal amount. But the
mistakes made in these cases did not give rise to excuse defenses by the adversely
impacted sellers because their performances of delivering the goods at issue were not
rendered impossible nor impracticable, nor were their primary purposes substantially
frustrated.28
Comment (c) specifically states that events that result in hardship to the party
VHHNLQJ UHOLHI EXW WKDW GR QRW FRQIHU DQ DGYDQWDJH XSRQ WKH RWKHU SDUW\ DUH ³RUGLQDULO\
DSSURSULDWHO\OHIWWRWKHUXOHVRQLPSUDFWLFDELOLW\DQGIUXVWUDWLRQ´ 29 The Comment then
presents an illustration that conveys the principle that if supervening knowledge of a fact
substantially frustrates the purpose of one party, but does not impact the other party, then
³WKH HIIHFW RQ WKH DJUHHG H[FKDQJH RI SHUIRUPDQFHV LV QRW PDWHULDO´ and the adversely
impacted party should instead seek relief under the Section 266(2) supervening frustration
provision.30
This position presented in Comment (c) and elaborated upon by this illustration is
an interesting idea as to the proper relationship of the mutual mistake and excuse defense
approaches, giving each approach a distinct and well-defined scope of application, with
there being relatively little overlap.31 The persuasiveness of this Illustration as a positive
statement of the law, however, is uQGHUFXWE\WKHIDFWWKDWWKH5HSRUWHU¶V1RWHWR6HFWLRQ
VWDWHVWKDWWKLVSDUWLFXODULOOXVWUDWLRQZDV³VXJJHVWHGE\Anderson Bros. v. O’Meara´32
The Reporter appears, however, to have unfortunately misread the holding of this case,
which denied relief for mutual mistake on the basis that the mistake was unilateral rather
than mutual, if there had been a mistake made at all,33 and not because the impact of a
mutual mistake was only upon the party seeking relief. The Anderson Bros. case does not
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24. Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887) (granting the seller relief on a mutual mistake defense
theory).
25. Wood v. Boynton, 25 N.W. 42 (Wisc. 1885) (denying the seller relief sought on a mutual mistake defense
theory).
26. Sherwood, 33 N.W. at 925.
27. Wood, 25 N.W. at 45.
28. But see ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. 53, 78 (1980) (holding that an event that will turn an expected profit into
a substantial loss may justify a frustration of purpose defense).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981). The Comment
unfortunately fails to elaborate as to what exceptional circumstances might justify departing from this ³ordinarily
appropriate´ principle.
30. Id. at § 152, cmt. c, illus. 9. In my opinion the point made by this Illustration would be more clear if the
Comment had taken the position that a mutual mistake that significantly impacts only one party to a contract
does not qualify as a ³material effect on the agreed exchange,´ despite perhaps having a ³material´ impact,
because a mistake with an effect on only one party even if ³material´ should not be regarded as having an impact
³on the exchange.´ But the comment instead limits ³materiality´ itself only to those events having a significant
impact upon both parties.
31. But see ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 70 (the court held that the mutual mistake defense and the
impracticability excuse defense and the frustration of purpose excuse defense all applied under those
circumstances).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152, Reporter¶s Note to cmt. c; see Anderson Bros. v.
O¶Meara, 306 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1962).
33. Anderson, 306 F.2d at 677.
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hold, or evHQ ³VXJJHVW,´ WKDW WR EH UHJDUGHG DV D PXWXDO PLVWDNH MXVWLI\LQJ UHOLHI WKH
revelation of the unknown facts must impact both parties to the contract, and it is somewhat
FRQFHUQLQJWKDWWKH5HSRUWHU¶V1RWHGRHVQRWUHIHUWRDQ\PRUHRQ-point case precedents
that would support this proposition. 34
The extent to which courts embrace this restrictive definition of materiality in the
mutual mistake context that is suggested by Comment (c) is uncertain. The noted contract
law scholar Allan Farnsworth was ambivalent on this point in his well-known singlevolume contract law treatise. He first stated broadly that a party seeking to assert a mutual
PLVWDNHGHIHQVHKDVD³EHWWHUFKDQFH´RIHVWDEOLVKLQJPDWHULDOLW\LI³WKHPLVWDNHDOVRKDV
DQLPSDFWRQWKHRWKHUSDUW\´35 However, the only case that Farnsworth cited in support
of this claim expresses agreement only in dicta in a ruling that denied the mutual mistake
defense on assumption of risk grounds. 36 Farnsworth also in his discussion cited a
contrasting case that in hLVRSLQLRQ³VXSSRUWVWK>Hopposing] view that hardship for one
SDUW\LVDVXIILFLHQWEDVLVIRUDYRLGDQFHIRUPLVWDNH´ 37 and called attention to the position
taken in Comment (c) that even where a mutual mistake has had no impact on the other
party to the contract, a person may be able to obtain mutual mistake relief under
³H[FHSWLRQDO FDVHV´38 which are left undefined. He also noted more generally that the
PXWXDOPLVWDNHFDVHV³DUHQRWPDUNHGE\WKHLUFRQVLVWHQF\LQHLWKHUUHDVRQLQJRUUHVXOW´ 39
34. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has specifically rejected this interpretation of Comment (c) as
requiring for a mutual mistake defense a showing that both parties to the contract are impacted by the mistake:
³Rather, comment (c) [to Section 152] prescribes a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, in which either or
both parties may be adversely affected by a mutual mistake.´ Roers v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 728 F.3d
832, 837 (8th Cir. 2013).
35.
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A related distinction [to the mutual mistake versus assumption of risk grounds on which the case
before the court was decided] is the manner in which the mistake«DIIHFWV WKH FRQWHPSODWHG
performance or the equivalence of value. To the extent that Alcoa [in the ALCOA case] was
disadvantaged by the mistake, Essex [the other party to the contract] was enriched. Here, by contrast,
while the unavailability of reprocessing has the effect of making performance by Westinghouse more
expensive, it in no way enriches Florida [the other party to the contract], or gives Florida any benefit
it did not bargain for.
In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440, 458 (E.D. Va. 1981) (referred to by FARNSWORTH,
supra note 11, at 608 n.19).
37. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 607 (³Case law supports this view that hardship for one party is a
sufficient basis for avoidance for mistake.´); see also Dover Pool & Racquet Club v. Brooking, 322 N.E. 2d 168,
171 (Mass. 1975) (³[A]s a result of the mistake enforcement of the contract would be materially more onerous
to the purchaser than it would have been had the facts been as the parties believed them to be. The contract was
therefore voidable by the purchaser . . . .´).
38. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 607 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 cmt. c (AM.
LAW INST. 1981)).
39. Id. at 605.
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The party adversely affected [by a mutual mistake] has a better chance of showing that the effect on
the agreed exchange is material if . . . the mistake also has an impact on the other party. Courts have
been reluctant to allow avoidance if the mistake merely makes the exchange less desirable for one
party . . . . [C]ases of [unilateral] hardship are ordinarily left to be dealt with under the rules on
impracticability and frustration.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 607±08; see also MURRAY, supra note 21, at 494 (³If the discovered mistake
reveals an exchange that is not only substantially less desirable for one party, but substantially more desirable
for the other, a court will be more amenable to granting relief than if there is merely a loss to one party without
a corresponding gain to the other.´).
36.

41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 8 Side B

09/18/2019 11:37:45

CRESPI, G - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

10

9/17/2019 1:57 PM

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1

C M
Y K

09/18/2019 11:37:45

40. ³In many of the cases that come under . . . Section [266], relief under the rules relating to mistake . . . will
also be appropriate. . . . In that event the party entitled to relief may, of course, choose the ground on which he
will rely.´ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266, cmt. a. See also, e.g., ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. 53, 70±
72 (1980).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152, cmt. c.
42. That Comment later significantly undercuts its recommendation for use of this stringent standard by
broadly stating that ³[t]he standard of materiality here, as elsewhere in the Restatement (e.g. Section 237) is a
flexible one to be applied in light of all the circumstances.´ Id. Comment (a) to Section 237 then refers the reader
back to the broad, multi-factor determination of materiality set forth in Section 241. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 237, cmt. a.
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Even under WKLV QDUURZ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH ³PDWHULDO HIIHFW RQ WKH DJUHHG
H[FKDQJH´SKUDVLQJRI 6HFWLRQ  DVUHTXLULQJWKDWD PXWXDO PLVWDNH PXVW KDYHDQ
impact upon both parties to provide a basis for relief, there will still be some overlap
between these two approaches. There are instances for which the events at issue, when
they come to light, will not only have a material impact upon both parties but will also
potentially meet the requirements of one or more excuse defenses, 40 presenting the party
seeking relief with a choice of approaches to pursue. As discussed above, a comparison of
the texts of Sections 152(1) and 266(1) and (2) would appear to favor assertion of the
mutual mistake defense as easier to establish in all circumstances where both that defense
and an excuse defense are potentially available.
However, Comment (c) to Section 152 not only suggests that an event must impact
both parties to the contract to be material but also suggests that even where both parties
are impacted, the materiality threshold for the mutual mistake defense should be set at a
very high level. To the extent that the courts take this suggestion, it will be relevant for the
choice of approaches because it will adversely impact the prospects for success with the
mutual mistake approach. Specifically, Comment (c) states that for a person seeking relief
WRVKRZWKLVPDWHULDOHIIHFW³>L@t is not enough for him to prove that he would not have
made the contract had it not been for the mistake. He must show that the resulting
imbalaQFHLQWKHH[FKDQJHLVVRVHYHUHWKDWKHFDQQRWEHIDLUO\UHTXLUHGWRFDUU\LWRXW´ 41
7KLVTXRWHIURPWKH&RPPHQWHTXDWHV³PDWHULDOHIIHFW´ZLWKD³VHYHUHLPEDODQFH´
sufficient to make the exchange unfair, an extremely high materiality threshold when
contrasted with the commonly applied and much less demanding standards of materiality
LQRWKHUFRQWH[WVWKDW,KDYHQRWHGDERYH,IWKLVVWULQJHQW³VHYHUHLPEDODQFH´PDWHULDOLW\
standard were to be widely embraced by the courts for resolving mutual mistake claims,
this would greatly reduce or perhaps even eliminate altogether the gap between the
³PDWHULDOHIIHFW´VKRZLQJUHTXLUHGIRUWKHPXWXDOPLVWDNHGHIHQVHDQGWKHYHU\VXEVWDQWLDO
impacts that are required for the impracticability, impossibility, or frustration of purpose
excuse defenses. However, other portions of Comment (c) undercut this call for consistent
application of such a stringent materiality standard rather than applying the much less
demanding materiality standards generally applied in commercial law or in securities law,
or the broader but still less restrictive multi-factor standard for determining materiality in
the implied-in-law contractual conditions context that is set forth in Section 241.42
Despite the ambivalent position taken by Comment (c) on the appropriate materiality
WKUHVKROGDVXEVWDQWLDOQXPEHURIFRXUWVKDYHFLWHGDSSURYLQJO\WKLV³VHYHUHLPEDODQFH´
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language in ruling upon mutual mistake defense claims, 43 as have some commentators,44
with some of these courts finding the claims before them to have met this stringent
materiality standard,45 while a somewhat larger number of other courts have applied this
standard but found it to not have been met, 46 and still other courts have embraced this
standard in dicta but have then resolved the mutual mistake claim presented to them on
other grounds.47
D. Discussion of Comment (c) to Section 152
The portion of Comment (c) to Section 152 that suggests that the scope of the mutual
mistake defense should be restricted to circumstances where the events at issue have
affected the benefits and burdens of the contract to both parties, and thereby relegate to
the excuse defenses any claims for relief based upon supervening knowledge under
circumstances where RQO\RQHSDUW\¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRUDELOLW\WRKDYHWKHFRQWUDFWPHHW
their purposes, has been significantly impacted by those events, makes some sense as a
categorization framework. This framework would clarify the scope of each approach and
would greatly limit their areas of overlap, although both approaches would still be
potentially available under those circumstances where the events at issue have
significantly impacted both parties to the contract. But it would also raise some new
concerns that are not addressed in the Comment.
Under that suggested framework many, if not most, attempts to obtain judicial relief
based upon supervening knowledge of an existing event would have to be argued as an
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43. See, e.g., McKeever v. Warden, SCI-Grateford, 486 F.3d 81, 86 (3d Cir. 2007); Roers v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., 728 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Frownfelter, 626 F.3d 549, 556 (10th Cir.
2010); ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 64; Breeze v. United States, No. 2:03-CR-06, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9598, at
*16 (E.D. Tenn. 2013); Leading Edge Dev. Servs. v. EnXco, Inc., No. C05-3047-MWB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
92654, at *31 (N.D. Iowa 2006); Miami Valley Paper v. Lebbing Eng¶g & Consulting GBMH, No. 1:05-cv-702,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150333, at *4 (S.D. Ohio 2010); Roers v. Bank of Am., No. 10-cv-3107, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 116725, at *39 (D. Minn. 2012); United States v. Thompson, No. 16-907, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32820,
at *15 (W.D. Pa. 2017); Land Grantors in Henderson, Union v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 661, 706 (Fed. Cl.
2005); Land Grantors v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 614, 627 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Land Grantors v. United States, 81
Fed. Cl. 580, 605 (Fed. Cl. 2008); Stegen v. Hanson, No. 3-557/12-1980, 2013 Iowa App. LEXIS 776, at *8±9
(Iowa App. 2013); Hillside Ass¶n of Hollis v. Me. Bonding & Cas. Co., 605 A.2d 1026, 1030 (N.H. 1992); City
of Cape May v. Dash, No. A-1613-06T1, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1624, at *35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2008); Eteson v. Eteson, No. A-5148-09T2, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2547, at *13±14 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2011); Wrisley v. Krock, 2000 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 438, at *9 (Pa. Comm. Pleas Ct.
2000); Pawtucket Lodge No. 4 v. City of Pawtucket, No. 84-5000, 1985 R.I. Super. LEXIS 160, at *7±8 (R.I.
Super. Ct. 1985); Schildkamp v. Feed Commodities Int¶l, LLC, No. 16-205, 2016 Vt. Unpub. LEXIS 238, at *10
(Vt. 2016).
44. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 606 (citing approvingly the Comment (c) ³severe imbalance´
materiality criterion suggestion); MURRAY, supra note 21, at 494 (citing a case that quoted the ³severe
imbalance´ language of Comment (c)).
45. See, e.g., ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 64; Land Grantors in Henderson, 64 Fed. Cl. at 706±07; Land
Grantors, 81 Fed. Cl. at 606; Hillside Ass’n of Hollis, 605 A.2d at 1030; Pawtucket Lodge, 1985 R.I. Super.
LEXIS 160, at *8.
46. See, e.g., Thompson, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32820, at *25; Schildkamp, 2016 Vt. Unpub. LEXIS 238, at
*11; Stegen, 2013 Iowa App. LEXIS 776, at *15±16; Roers v. Bank of Am., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116725, at
*41; Eteson, 2011 NJ Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2547, at *13; Frownfelter, 626 F.3d at 556; City of Cape May, 2008
N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1624, at *35; McKeever, 486 F.3d at 86.
47. See, e.g., Roers v. Countrywide Home Loans, 728 F.3d at 836; Breeze, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9598, at
*18; Land Grantors, 71 Fed. Cl. at 626; Wrisley, 2000 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 438, at *17.
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excuse defense because only the adversely affected party was impacted by the event, and
no advantage was conferred on the other party by the event. This limitation of the scope
of the mutual mistake defense would reduce litigation costs in that it would spare the
person seeking relief under those circumstances from the burden of having to argue and
prove each of two alternative theories to fully make their case for relief, and would
consequently also similarly reduce the burden on the court in resolving this issue. On the
other hand, judicial acceptance of this framework would very sharply curtail the
availability of the mutual mistake defense. Those persons who can establish that an event
unknown to the parties at the time of contracting has materially and adversely impacted
them, but who cannot demonstrate that the event has also benefitted the other party, would
then have to show that the event has had sufficient adverse impact upon them to render
their performance impossible or impracticable, or to partially frustrate their primary
purpose, very demanding requirements, or they will be denied relief.48
Comment (c) to Section 152 also raises the question of how significant the impact
of a mutual mistake must be on a person before that person can obtain relief from their
contractual obligations on that basis. However, even if the Section 152(1) requirement for
WKHPXWXDOPLVWDNHGHIHQVHWKDWWKHPLVWDNHKDYHD³PDWHULDOHIIHFWRQWKHH[FKDQJH´LV
LQWHUSUHWHG DVWKH&RPPHQWVRPHZKDWDPELYDOHQWO\UHFRPPHQGV DVLPSRVLQJD³VHYHUH
LPEDODQFH´VWDQGDUGUDWKHUWKDQHLWKHUWKe much less stringent materiality criteria usually
applied under commercial law or securities law, or the also less stringent Section 241
multi-factor criteria for finding materiality in the implied-in-law conditions context, that
harsher materiality standard still appears to be less demanding than the onerous eligibility
criteria that must be met to successfully invoke either the impossibility, impracticability
RUIUXVWUDWLRQRISXUSRVHH[FXVHGHIHQVHV,PSRVLWLRQRID³VHYHUHLPEDODQFH´PDWHULDOLW\
criterion would therefore appear to still leave the mutual mistake approach at least
modestly more attractive than the excuse defense approach under those circumstances in
which a person might arguably qualify for relief under either approach.

When a person seeks judicial relief from their contractual obligations on the basis
that the parties to the contract were not aware of facts existing at the time of contracting,
through no fault of their own, and those facts when later revealed have made thaWSHUVRQ¶V
performance arguably either impracticable or impossible, or have arguably partially
frustrated their primary purpose in entering into the contract, the text of Restatement
(Second) of Contracts Sections 152(1) and 266(1) and (2) viewed in isolation suggests that
both the mutual mistake defense and one or another of the excuse defenses will each be
available as plausible argumentative approaches, and that the mutual mistake defense will
generally be easier to establish because the materiality of the mistake will usually be less
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48. Whether the scope of mutual mistake relief should be so limited is a larger question that is not addressed
by Comment (c), and that I will also not address in this brief essay. I am here focusing solely on the scope of
application and relative attractiveness of the mutual mistake and excuse defense approaches for seeking relief
under supervening knowledge circumstances, given the eligibility contours that courts are in fact likely to apply
for each of these approaches, and not on the more theoretical and more difficult question of the proper eligibility
criteria that should be applied for each approach.
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49. See, e.g., ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 65.
50. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, 27±28.
51. See citations, supra note 46.
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difficult to establish than would be the more demanding criteria of each of the excuse
defenses.
&RPPHQW F  WR 6HFWLRQ  KRZHYHU JRHV ZHOO EH\RQG WKH 6HFWLRQ¶V WH[W LQ
suggesting two limitations on the scope of the mutual mistake defense that would make
the choice of approach to pursue for relief more complicated. That Comment first suggests
that the mutual mistake defense should be limited in its application to only those
circumstances where the facts that later come to light impact the benefits and burdens of
the contract to both parties, and in general should not be allowed under those
circumstances where the facts, when revealed, have a material impact on one party
SRVVLEO\ VXEVWDQWLDO HQRXJK WR UHQGHU WKDW SDUW\¶V SHrformance impossible or
LPSUDFWLFDEOH RU SDUWLDOO\ IUXVWUDWH WKDW SDUW\¶V SULPDU\ SXUSRVH LQ HQWHULQJ LQWR WKH
contract, but that do not affect the value of the contract to the other party. That Comment
essentially calls for a requirement that a mutual mistake have a material effect on both
SDUWLHVLHDPDWHULDOHIIHFW³RQWKHH[FKDQJH´UDWKHUWKDQVLPSO\DPDWHULDOLPSDFWRQ
the person seeking relief.
If this limit on the scope of the mutual mistake defense was judicially embraced, it
would clarify in most instances which of these two approaches were a more suitable basis
for relief, given the circumstances, although in some instances both approaches for seeking
relief would still be available.49 But adoption of this limiting principle would do more than
simply provide clarification as to which approach was more appropriate. It would also
severely restrict the availability of the mutual mistake defense under circumstances where
the facts, when revealed, materially impact only one party to the contract, and where the
impact is not sufficient for that person to meet the stringent excuse defense criteria. Absent
a judicial consensus that the scope of the mutual mistake defense should be so sharply
curtailed, it would probably be preferable to develop some other criterion for determining
when a contracting party who seeks relief based on supervening knowledge of existing
facts should pursue a mutual mistake approach, and when they should instead seek to
invoke an excuse defense.
Whether or not the mutual mistake defense is interpreted to require that both parties
be impacted by the mistake, in those supervening knowledge instances, where either the
mutual mistake or the excuse defense approach arguably meets the requisite criteria, the
question remains as to which approach would be more promising to the party seeking
relief. The text of the relevant Restatement (Second) Sections 152(1) and 266(1) and (2),
as discussed above, suggest that the mutual mistake approach will dominate the excuse
defense approach under all circumstances of supervening knowledge. 50 However, one
portion of Comment (c) to Section 152 somewhat ambivalently suggests a second
OLPLWDWLRQRQWKHPXWXDOPLVWDNHGHIHQVHDOLPLWDWLRQWKDWWKH³PDWHULDOHIIHFW´FULWHULRQ
should require a showing of D³VHYHUHLPEDODQFH´RID PDJQLWXGHVXIILFLHQWWR PDNHLW
unfair to hold the adversely impacted person to their contractual obligation. This strict
criterion, which as I have noted has been embraced by a significant number of courts, 51
would sharply limit the advantage of pressing the mutual mistake approach for relief over
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attempting to satisfy any of the excuse defenses with their strict requirements. But it would
not entirely eliminate that advantage given how difficult those excuse defense criteria are
to meet.
In overall conclusion, the mutual mistake defense should probably be advanced at
least as an alternative ground for relief in any instance where one is seeking to be excused
IURP RQH¶V FRQWUDFWXDO REOLJDWLRQV RQ WKH EDVLV RI LPSRVVLELOLW\ LPSUDFWicability or
frustration of purpose as a result of supervening knowledge. There does not appear to be
any significant downside risk of doing so.52 The mutual mistake approach certainly will
have a substantial advantage over the excuse defense approach if the reviewing court does
QRWUHTXLUHDVKRZLQJRILPSDFWXSRQERWKSDUWLHVWRWKHFRQWUDFWWRPHHWWKH³PDWHULDO
HIIHFWRQWKHH[FKDQJH´UHTXLUHPHQWRIWKLVDSSURDFK$QGHYHQLIDUHVWULFWLYH³VHYHUH
LPEDODQFH´PDWHULDOLW\UHTXLUHPHQWLVLPSRVHGE\WKHFRXUt, as will often be the case, this
will still probably be an easier showing to make than satisfying the very demanding
requirements of either the impossibility, impracticability, or frustration of purposes
defenses.
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52. As a matter of argumentative strategy, however, pleading a very weak argument, even only as an
alternative ground for recovery, may possibly distract a court from focusing on and recognizing the merits of the
stronger arguments that one is presenting. A decision should be made as to whether such secondary arguments
that can be pleaded in the alternative are plausible enough to avoid tainting by association the primary theories
being advanced.

